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ABSTRACT (86 words) 
 
What’s in a Price? the American Raw Cotton Market in Liverpool and the Anglo-American war 
 
This article argues that an embryonic futures market was present in Liverpool during the Anglo-American 
war. The analysis of a previously unseen dataset of printed Prices Currents has facilitated not only a price 
series of raw cotton prices, but an in-depth analysis of the ‘construction’ of those raw cotton prices. By 
positing a definition of.an embryonic futures market and then analysing each of the features of a such a 
market in turn, this study demonstrates the existence of an embryonic futures market in early nineteenth-
century Liverpool.  
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MAIN TEXT 
 
What’s in a Price? the American Raw Cotton market in Liverpool and the Anglo-American war 
 
Introduction 
 
Cotton fascinates us, both as a consumable product and as a global commodity.1 Indeed, there is a vast 
literature on the development of cotton markets and the construction of prices of cotton yarn and textiles.2 
However, as was noted by Peter Temin in 1967, ‘The course of cotton prices has been recounted many 
times, but an explanation [author’s emphasis] of their movements more often than not has been lacking’.3 
Indeed, what work exists on the early Liverpool cotton market has much more to say about the development 
of specialist cotton brokers than the construction or making of price.4 This article redresses this imbalance. 
In particular, it argues that raw cotton prices were ‘constructed’ in Liverpool in the early-nineteenth century 
through an embryonic futures market. The first section outlines the sources and methodology used. The 
second discusses the participants and features of a modern futures market and posits a definition of an 
embryonic futures market. The third briefly charts the rise of cotton as an American agricultural product and 
its links to the port of Liverpool in the context of the Anglo-American War. The fourth section considers 
each of the participants and features of a modern futures market in turn in this historical context. The last 
concludes that there was an embryonic futures market in Liverpool at this time.  
 
Sources and Methodology 
 
The sources for this article are predominantly printed American Prices Currents sent from a variety of 
leading mercantile houses in Liverpool to their correspondents in Providence, Rhode Island between 1800 
and 1820. These are held at the John Carter Brown Library (JCB), Providence, Rhode Island, USA. Prices 
Currents were originally quoted in manuscript form as an addendum to hand-written business letters. The 
main letter dealt with the particular business dealings of the correspondents, rumours and occasionally 
gossip, whilst the Prices Currents kept their correspondents up to date on prices and supply and demand of a 
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variety of commodities particular to their market. The earliest printed Prices Current found for Amsterdam 
dates from 1585.5 However, they were printed in a more standard format from the 1790s onwards which 
facilitated the consistent listing of far more commodities, and their various grades. Although hand written 
Prices Current persisted into the nineteenth century, possibly for their personal touch, printed versions soon 
became the norm globally.6 Therefore, the collection at Brown also includes Prices Current from ports such 
as Havana, Copenhagen and St. Petersburg. They are also extant for Paris and Antwerp for the early 
nineteenth century although they were used much earlier.7 British colonial markets such as Kingston, 
Jamaica, Nassau in the Bahamas, Barbados and Grenada all produced their own printed Prices Currents by 
the early nineteenth century.8 They all followed a standard format, depending on the market. Importantly for 
this study, they usually provided an expansive explanatory text which gave reasons for the changing prices, 
as perceived by the merchants sending out the information. These included the success or failure of harvests, 
financial failure, the activities of speculators, political news and rumours. The Prices Currents for Liverpool 
sent to Providence all followed this trend. They are therefore an extremely useful, if under-utilised source. A 
one hundred per cent sample was taken of all extant Liverpool Prices Currents found in the Brown Family 
Business Papers and the Arnold Family Business Papers at the JCB dated January 1800 to December 1819.9 
The dataset presented here was constructed from a variety of files within those two collections. Despite 
some gaps in the data, which preclude a more quantitative analysis, this collection facilitates a very detailed 
price series of the various grades of raw cotton in the Liverpool market.10 
 
Prices were taken for the following cotton types, and where available, the various grades: Georgia Uplands, 
Sea Island, and New Orleans. These represent the early successful crops in the United States (for the short-
staple Georgia cotton and Barbadense long-staple cotton from the Carolinas) and after the 1803 Louisiana 
purchase, the popular short-staple New Orleans.11 These were also the most reliably recorded in the Prices 
Currents. Where multiple Prices Currents are extant for one month, each month’s prices may be taken from 
more than one Prices Current, with (for consistency) the highest quoted price for each type and grade 
recorded in the database.  
 
Participants and Features of a Futures Market 
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The history of futures markets often centres around the Chicago Board of Trade (grain) established in 1848, 
or the Chicago Produce Exchange (perishable goods) established in 1874 (later the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange).12 Other futures markets usually noted include soybeans, crude oil, hogs, gold and silver.13 This 
focus on the mid-nineteenth century continues despite the fact that in 1982 Jeffrey Williams noted forward 
trading in London in the seventeenth century for herring and grain.14 Cotton is not mentioned very often, and 
indeed, as David Williams noted in 2000, ‘We know little about ... the beginnings of futures trading’ in 
cotton at Liverpool.15 This is particularly strange given that today, fifty per cent of the world’s international 
cotton contracts follow the Liverpool Cotton Association rules developed in that city during the first half of 
the nineteenth century, and first written as formal rules by the Liverpool Cotton Brokers association in 
1864.16 Indeed, it is around this date that conventional wisdom tells us ‘true futures dealings came about’.17 
 
However, definitions of a modern futures market are narrow – requiring only the existence of a formal 
exchange (site), with written rules and regulations and standardised futures contracts.18 Nevertheless, 
understanding how a futures market actually works requires a wider conceptualisation. For example, futures 
markets have particular participants. Indeed, futures markets only exist because certain actors (usually 
dealers) want to reduce their exposure to price risk.19 These actors include: dealers (hedgers) who are 
usually risk averse and want to reduce their exposure to price fluctuation;  speculators, who seek to profit 
from price variability (including arbitrageurs), and brokers, who deal on behalf of those who are not part of 
the formal exchange.20 In our historical context, other purchases of cotton included manufacturers, akin to 
the dealers in terms of trying to reduce their exposure to price risk. It will be demonstrated that all these 
participants were present in the Liverpool raw cotton market in the period under discussion, and that they 
helped to shape the construction of price. There are also several features of futures markets. Reliable and 
known grades of commodities are a “prerequisite”.21 Cotton falls into the agricultural commodities category, 
and is known as a soft commodity (food and fibres).22 In the raw cotton market, quality is assessed on grade, 
colour, staple length and character (which might include uniformity, fineness and strength of the fibre).23 
Interestingly, many of the grade names from the early nineteenth century are very similar for those in the 
twenty-first.24 There is also usually a wide variation in price. These price differentials reflect the quality as 
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well as the (present and assessed future) demand of any particular quality or grade of commodity, though it 
is worth noting that prices of different qualities and grades do not always follow the same trend as 
purchasers choose different qualities when some are scarce.25 This price variability creates uncertainty, 
which is what dealers (hedgers) try to negotiate through the futures market.26 Indeed, a primary function of 
futures markets is the discovery, or ‘construction’ of prices, in that the market mediates news of possible 
supply shocks by disseminating information.27 The construction of price therefore includes present supply 
and demand, but also considerations of future supply and demand, whether affected by rumour, harvests, 
war or other political crises. Added to this uncertainty are the elements of time and space, calling for 
fulfilment of a contract at some future date. Such future delivery can add transport and storage costs, which 
feed into the basis (the price spread between the cash price and the futures price).28 Future delivery requires 
futures contracts, which are highly fungible financial instruments traded on an organised futures market. 
They are independent of the identity of the buyer and the seller, and the holder of a futures contract may 
never own or possess the actual commodity. It is also worth noting that forward contracts are also common 
within a futures market, but they are not standardised or traded on organised exchanges.29 ‘To arrive’ 
contracts are also closely related to futures markets; the only distinction is who pays the loading and 
unloading fees.30 It will be demonstrated that many of these features were present in the early nineteenth-
century Liverpool raw cotton market. 
 
As noted above, the modern definition of a futures market is narrow. This article does not seek to question 
this view of a modern futures market, but it does argue that an embryonic futures market was in existence on 
early nineteenth-century Liverpool.31 To do so it defines an embryonic futures market as: 
 
One which exhibits many (if not all) of the participants and features of a modern futures market, but which 
is in a rudimentary stage with potential for development.32 
 
Indeed, the wider literature on modern futures markets outlined above argues strongly that the various 
participants and features of a futures market are essential features. Therefore, if we base our analysis on 
these participants and features rather than an arbitrary narrow definition we come to a more subtle and 
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nuanced understanding of how futures markets work, and can clearly see that an embryonic futures market 
was in existence in the early nineteenth-century Liverpool raw cotton market.  
 
The Rise of Cotton and the Liverpool Market 
 
Cotton agriculture in the United States boomed from 1795, surpassing rice, tobacco and indigo by 1801. 
Table 1 shows the rapid rise in the production and export of US cotton. Northern ports, including 
Providence, quickly took on an important role as entrepôts in the United States’ cotton trade.33 
 
Table 1: Bales of US Cotton Produced and Exported 1791-1821 
 
Year Produced Exported % Exported 
1791 9,000 890 9.9 
1801 211,000 92,000 43.6 
1811 269,000 209,000 77.7 
1821 647,000 449,000 69.4 
 
Source: Bruchey, Cotton and the Growth, Table 3A.  
 
Steady imports of cotton were evident by 1756 in Liverpool.34 Before 1780 however, most of this came from 
the Levant, some small amounts came from the West Indies, and after 1781, Brazil. A little came from India 
via the East India Company, but this was never very successful because the very short staple was not 
suitable for the new industrial processes.35 However, in 1800, 40,000 bales of cotton arrived from the US 
alone.36 During 1806-1810, 107,500 bales were imported into Britain from the United States out of a total of 
202,290. In contrast, cotton from the British West Indies and Brazil was each only around 32,000 bales.37 By 
the beginning of the nineteenth century, a vast and intricate web of commerce had already created a 
regional, national and global interest grounded in the raw cotton of the lower south.38 This sudden rise had 
been assisted by a number of improvements and inventions in the later 1700s. In Britain, Richard Arkwright 
patented his water frame in 1769 and in 1770 James Hargreaves patented his Jenny.39 Both increased 
productivity, but neither produced the range of yarns that textile manufacturers required.40 However, in 1779 
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Samuel Crompton introduced the mule on which spinners could produce multiple yarns in a range of sizes.41 
By 1800 steam powered mules carried over 250 spindles, increasing cotton yarn production greatly.42 In the 
United State the saw cotton gin allegedly patented by Eli Whitney in 1794 was very important in meeting 
the increased demand for short-staple cotton which was used for mass coarse yarn production.43 Yarns made 
from Sea Island long-staple cotton, which was also important in the Liverpool cotton market, was more 
expensive to produce but was considered essential for spinning fine and strong yarns.44 By 1795 cotton was 
being grown in large amounts in the United States, and Liverpool was the leading importer of cotton in 
Britain.45 Table 2 shows the large-scale of imports of US cotton into Liverpool despite the increasing tension 
and subsequent Anglo-American war, making that port an excellent case study for the analysis of raw cotton 
prices in Britain. 
 
Table 2: Imports of Cotton into Liverpool 1807-1814 
Year No of Bales 
1807 143,756 
1810 199,220 
1812 79,258 
1813 18,640 
1814 40,448 
Source: Ellison, Cotton Trade, pp.170-71; 1812-14, Daniels, ‘American Cotton Trade’ p.278. 1 
 
Indeed, the relationship of Liverpool with US cotton continued to develop despite the context of the French 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars and the Anglo-American War of 1812-14.46 There was a brief respite 
between 1801 and 1803, but Britain’s Orders in Council of 1805 brought in a strict system of blockades, and 
Napoleon’s Milan and Berlin Decrees brought in the continental blockade and declared hostility against 
American shipping which further affected cotton supply and demand between 1806 and 1813.47 By 1807 
English actions against American shipping had caused major political tensions, exacerbated by the 
‘Chesapeake’ affair in June of that year.48 This culminated in the American Embargo of 1807 (and 
                                                 
1 Daniels does give some prices for raw cotton 1807-14 but only for Bowed and Sea Island, and the analysis 
is of the market in the United States. His figures are far less than listed by the Rathbones in 1812.  
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subsequent Non-Importation Acts), and eventually the Anglo-American war of 1812-14.49 However, 
throughout these tensions the Liverpool merchants continued to correspond with their American contacts as 
often as they were able, which was good business practice.50  
 
An Embryonic Futures Market51 
 
Participants 
 
All of the participants in a modern futures market were present in early nineteenth-century Liverpool. The 
dealers included the merchants, of whom there were 986 by 1805, although only Thomas & Robert 
Tattersall, and Thomas Jameson listed themselves specifically as cotton merchants.52 Whilst there were 
seven cotton dealers listed in Gore’s Directory in 1805, all of those sending Prices Currents to Providence 
listed themselves as simply merchants (except for Conway & Davidson who actually listed themselves as 
Corn Merchants). Most merchants in this period dealt in a wide range of commodities, sometimes 
specialising by region. These merchants, or dealers, were mostly hedgers, in that they were risk averse. For 
example, in 1811, Hughes & Duncan bemoaned the overtrading which had caused so much financial 
suffering, and particularly ‘by the rage for speculating’.53 They clearly saw themselves as ‘respectable’ 
traders apart from the speculators. Hughes & Duncan, like many other merchants, were also averse to high-
risk taking. For example, Rathbone & Co. hedged even within cotton by buying cotton from the US, but also 
from Demerara and Surinam.54 Speculating was seen as akin to gambling and came under increasing 
criticism from the later eighteenth century onwards, as did stock jobbing.55 
 
The sources do not tell us the number of speculators, nor their names, but it is clear that they were an 
important part of the market at certain times. In August 1809, 3,000 bags out of 7,900 were bought on 
speculation.56 In September of that year Morrall & Borland reported that 30,000 out of 40,000 bags had been 
sold to speculators.57 In 1813 William & Richard Rathbone complained that the speculators ‘were extremely 
active for upwards of fourteen days’, purchasing nearly 35,000 bags, after which time sales were sluggish as 
a consequence.58 Speculators were unpopular with dealers. Joseph Howell blamed them when the price of 
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Uplands rose from 16d in December 1807 to 19.5d in February 1808.59 Later the same year Buchanan & 
Benn similarly blamed the speculators for pushing the price of cotton ‘materially above its relative [real] 
value’.60 Indeed, it was noted by Conway & Davidson that when speculators kept out of the market, prices 
were steadier (safer for the dealers).61 It is difficult to know whether the sub-category of arbitrageurs were 
present. However, it is most likely that at the very least speculators invested in various types of cotton as 
well as other commodities. The speculators were most likely higher-risk taking merchants who had cash to 
spare, but even those merchants involved in the high-risk slave trade had a wide portfolio through which 
they reduced their exposure to risk overall.62 
 
It is likely, as Dumbell suggested, that a specialisation towards a separate category of cotton brokers 
developed at this time, if slowly.63 In 1805, 196 traders listed themselves as brokers, but only eight listed 
themselves as cotton brokers.64 Many of these had good contacts with Manchester, the main distribution 
centre for raw cotton. These included George Marsden who appeared to be McConnell & Kennedy of 
Manchester’s main raw cotton supplier.65 In fact, many brokers may have come from Manchester (as did 
Nicholas Waterhouse a well-known cotton broker) because they understood the quality and grade 
requirements of the manufacturers. Brokers extended credit in terms of paying freight, import duties and 
insurance, as well as processing Bills of Exchange, thereby acquiring the ‘right’ to future sales.66 
 
Reliable and Known Grades 
 
Reliable and known grades clearly existed for both Old World and New World grades of cotton by the 
1810s. Rathbone, Hughes & Duncan regularly listed prices for Surats (from India), as did Morrall & 
Borland.67 Bengal and Smyrna cottons were also regularly listed.68 Moreover, many grades of cottons from 
the Americas were increasingly, and more regularly, listed. It may be a function of the fact that the Prices 
Currents used here were mainly for American producers, but it is notable that for the most popular cottons, 
Uplands and Sea Islands, many definable grades were listed. Given that these cottons were only grown in 
any large quantity from the mid-1790s, this is remarkable. Uplands were listed by such grades as 
Poor/Ordinary, Fair, Good, Fine, New and Prime. Sea Islands also had several distinctions: Ordinary, 
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Stained and Inferior, Middling, Good, Fine, Very Fine. Fine Sea Island was to have a silky quality with a 
cream colour.69 These grades are noticeably similar in name to the terms used for Official Standards of 
American Uplands in the United States in the twenty-first century.70 It is also clear that crops from certain 
islands were also named, for example St Simons. New Orleans was not regularly sub-graded, but 
occasionally it was noted as Ordinary, Middling, Fair and Fine.71 As the Prices Currents in Liverpool were 
constructed in part by news of the abundance and quality of the harvest in the Americas, correspondents on 
both sides of the Atlantic would have well understood these grades and sub grades. 
 
Not only were short and long-staple cottons used for coarse and fine yarns respectively, price was also 
determined by the grade of the various cottons composed of three factors, colour, foreign matter and 
character. These were important for determining the costs of production of the yarn to be produced. Yarn 
manufactured from higher-quality grades was cheaper to produce, partly because there was less foreign 
matter to extract.72 Depending on the price of the various grades of cotton and consumer demand for 
different types of textile, dealers and manufacturers would buy different types of raw cotton. For example, in 
1808 Joseph Howell noted that ‘In Cottons we have a great stir; and should we not have arrivals from the 
Brazils, prices must be enormous.’73 Labour costs would have also played a part. If labour costs were low, it 
might have been worth a manufacturer purchasing a lower grade of a particular type of cotton and paying 
more labour hours. Dealers and manufacturers were clearly aware of the different character of cottons, and 
some were already ‘branded’. 
  
Price Variability and Uncertainty 
 
Figure 1 clearly highlights the wide variability in price between 1800 and 1820. The uncertainty caused by 
this is also evidenced by the very fact that Liverpool dealers produced Prices Currents so regularly and so 
often.74 Their abundance in the records suggests that they were often sent weekly, even across the ocean, and 
certainly at least monthly. Indeed, agents in Liverpool still sent Prices Currents to Providence throughout 
1811, despite the fact that little trade was being conducted that year. In 1814, during the war, Hughes & 
Duncan noted that they were pleased to be able to write to their correspondents, ‘though circuitously’ 
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(possibly via Amelia Island).75 Not so many Prices Currents are extant in the JCB collection for 1814, but 
clearly due to the inability to send them, rather than the lack of willingness to do so. This would not have 
been worthwhile if there had not been so much uncertainty of which dealers felt they needed to keep their 
correspondents advised. 
 
Figure 1: Raw Cotton Prices in Liverpool, 1800-1819, in pence per lba 
 
a. Author’s database of raw cotton prices76 
 
Besides a brief spike in 1805, caused by the British Orders in Council of that year, prices were relatively 
stable 1800 to 1807, averaging about 16-18d per lb for New Orleans, 24d per lb for best Georgia Uplands, 
and 28-30d per lb for best Sea Island (the finest of which along with St Simons were the premium quality). 
Prices then fluctuated during the conflict running up to, and including, the Anglo-American War. They fell 
during 1815 and 1816 and stabilised somewhat, but remained higher than pre-war prices throughout the rest 
of the decade, with another high in late 1818.77 Prices were generally lower overall during the period 1807-
1814, but the Providence and Liverpool cotton merchants had to deal with the extra complication of the rise 
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in tension between their governments, and the resulting war.78 Figure 2 outlines the prices of raw cotton in 
Liverpool during this period of tension, on which the remainder of this article will focus.  
 
Figure 2: Raw Cotton Prices in Liverpool, 1807-14, in pence per lba 
 
a. Author’s database of raw cotton prices 
 
Despite the rising tensions of 1807, prices remained relatively stable. This was due to the expectations of the 
Liverpool market (see price discovery below). However, by 1808 prices began to rise, no doubt because 
news of the American Embargo, enacted 22nd December 1807 would have been received in Liverpool by 
then. The price of Fine Uplands rose from 16d in December 1807 to 19.5d by February 1808; much of 
which was attributed by the dealers to the activities of speculators rather than true demand.79 In March the 
United States repealed the Embargo, but replaced it with the Non-Importation Act, pushing up the prices of 
all cottons. By September the best Sea Islands fetched 48d per lb, up from 30d in March, a rise of 62.5 per 
cent. In October, some very fine Sea Island, which was then scarce, reached 54d (an 80 per cent increase in 
total); prices of all American produce were described by Buchanan & Benn as ‘exorbitantly high’.80 
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During 1809 prices started to rise again and reached another high in February; Fine Sea Islands reached a 
peak of 64d per lb (a rise of 113 per cent on March 1808). In March and April however, prices began to fall 
drastically, and continued to fall throughout the year, except for a brief recovery in October and November. 
Sea Islands reached a low of 27d per lb in June and July 1809, lower than in March 1807.  Ordinary Uplands 
also fell to 12.5d (having reached a high of 31.5d per lb in February 1809), also lower than their March 1807 
price of 18.5d per lb. The Rathbones put the reducing price down to large importations, which included a 
number of ‘embargo breakers’.81 
 
Rumours that the Non-Importation Act might be repealed (and normal supply restored) reduced prices still 
further.82 In late March news was received in Liverpool that the repeal of the Nonimportation Act would be 
carried into effect.83 This anticipation of a reduced impediment to trade caused the price of all cottons to fall 
considerably, especially Fine Sea Islands, which fell to 30d per lb by the end of April. Apart from a brief 
and slight recovery in December 1809, prices continued to decline throughout 1809 and into 1810, due to 
expectations of a peaceful resolution. Indeed, the price of cottons started to fall again on most United States 
cottons in June once news had been received that the Non-Intercourse Act had at last been repealed (on 6 
June 1810). William & Richard Rathbone addressed their correspondents with a ‘feeling of pleasure 
proportioned to the state of anxiety and uncertainty’ in which they had been previously.84 The prices having 
fallen further, demand was up from the dealers, especially for Uplands (14.5d for Fair Uplands), and there 
had been many sales as the holders were happy to ‘realize’ at that price.85 Prices rose slightly in July (15.75d 
for Fair Uplands), however, prices continued to fall during 1810 reaching a low in November, when Fair 
Uplands were 13d and Fine Sea Islands 25d per lb. William & Richard Rathbone attributed this continued 
fall to a spate of bankruptcies throughout the country in the autumn, which had ‘excited a spirit of 
despondency’.86 
 
In January 1811 the Liverpool merchants were preoccupied with the Regency question and the British 
government’s potential change in stance over the Orders in Council. Hughes & Duncan were still hopeful of 
the repeal of at least those of November 1807. In the mean time the markets remained dull because of the 
‘long continuance of commercial distress’.87 Furthermore, a new Non-Importation Act was passed in the 
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United States on the 2nd February 1811, which prohibited the entry of any British goods.88 This caused 
prices to fall to their lowest in July 1811, by which time Fine Sea Islands had fallen to 21.5d per lb, and New 
Orleans to 13.75d. 89 Ordinary Uplands fell to 9.75d per lb in August 1811. In October they were still low. 
Prices of Fine Sea Islands were 22d and Fine Uplands 12.75d. However, demand was more animated by 
early November, and prices increased slightly. This was due to the fact that both buyers and sellers thought 
that under the present political situation, supplies would diminish.90 
 
Following a brief recovery in December 1811 and January 1812, prices rose very slowly throughout that 
year. Much uncertainty remained amongst the Liverpool traders, and there was some short-term variability 
in price which is hidden in the monthly data presented here. For example, as various vessels arrived in 
Liverpool with news from the United States, demand altered accordingly, almost daily. When the Lydia 
arrived in February with news of the warlike resolutions of the House of Representatives, demand and prices 
rose. Then, when another vessel arrived a few days later with news that limited importations from Britain 
might be allowed, demand and prices subsided again. Further news in late February concerning the 
possibility of a change in the British administration reduced demand for American produce still further.91 
Prices continued to fall into the summer, as those on the British side of the Atlantic were blissfully unaware 
that war had been declared on Britain by the United States on the 19th June 1812. Of course, when the news 
of the Declaration of War reached Liverpool on the 18th July, prices quickly rose on all American cottons, 
although not as much as previously.92 Rumours of Flags of Truce from the United States circulated and 
reduced prices for a few days in late August, but once the rumours were known to be without foundation, 
prices rose once again.93 By late October the British government had passed an Order in Council granting 
Letters of Marque and Reprisal against the United States. The war was clearly going to be protracted, and 
this ‘caused a lively demand for several articles of American produce’, especially cotton.94 By February 
1813, Fine Sea Islands had reached 48d per lb, New Orleans 28d per lb and Ordinary Uplands 22.75d per lb. 
Prices were roughly the same in May, but by July American produce had ‘been little enquired for’.95 Prices 
fell during the remainder of the year. 
 
17 
 
During 1814 prices vacillated, but in November they rose sharply for most grades of American cotton. 
Ordinary uplands increased to 28.75d per lb from 23.5d in July, and Sea Islands reached a high of 63d per 
lb, having been 44d in July. Fine Sea Islands peaked at 72d per lb in December, the highest price reached for 
raw cotton in the period covered here.96 Unfortunately there are no Prices Currents in the JCB collection on 
the reasons for this high, although Samuel Hope in Liverpool attributed it to a shortage of Sea Island stock.97 
Huge price variability was definitely present during this period. 
 
Price Discovery 
 
Prices were also ‘discovered’ in Liverpool at this time by a wide range of factors. These included: 
knowledge, perceived knowledge, rumour, past experience, expectations and hopes and fears. These factors 
both raised and lowered the price. In October 1807 Morrall & Borland reported that the political situation 
had not much affected the cotton market, because the ‘expectations’ of the Liverpool traders ‘did not lean to 
the idea of change’.98 However, a month later Martin, Hope & Thornely noted that many dealers had been 
selling in order to be able to pay bills of exchange which Americans were drawing on them ‘in 
contemplation of a probable rupture’.99 This particularly affected the prices of Uplands, but the prices of 
most American produce remained stable because many Liverpool merchants believed that the British 
government would resolve the Chesapeake affair to a peaceful conclusion. Indeed, in November, Morrall & 
Borland reported that very little apprehension remained, and despite a brisk speculative market in cotton, 
prices remained relatively stable.100 Even the Orders in Council of November 1807 did not materially affect 
prices, although there was an increase in speculation.101 The expectations of the Liverpool merchants were 
constructing the price, keeping them lower than might be expected during a period of tension.  
 
After this initial period of calm however, the Liverpool trading community became less complacent. By 
March 1808, the effects of the Embargo were being felt. Joseph Howell wrote that ‘The advance or decline 
of prices for American Produce much depends upon the continuation of the Embargo, should it be taken off, 
prices will materially decline tho’ the first arrivals, if sales are pushed, must pay tolerably well’[emphasis in 
original].102 Even a rumour that normal supplies were likely to be ‘renewed’ would cause the holders to be 
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anxious to realise [sell].103 Hughes & Duncan commented that their prices were to be considered as nominal 
– the holders wishing to sell from the expectation of a partial repeal of the embargo – and the dealers being 
reluctant to buy for the same reason.104 Clearly expectations that the conflict might be resolved was enough 
to reduce the price amongst the Liverpool cotton trading community, even if they remained uncertain. 
 
However, their expectations were wrong. When news of the Non-Intercourse Act replacing the Embargo 
reached Liverpool on the 15th April it caused a ‘sudden and extraordinary shock, and alarm and anxiety were 
every-where apparent’.105  The Erskine Treaty then opened trade between Britain and the United States on 
the 19th April, and in May the British government rescinded the Orders in Council of November and 
December 1807 and replaced them with a general blockade of France, Holland, Italy and their colonies and 
dependencies. This change in policy was also received with ‘surprise and astonishment’.106 In fact, the 
Erskine Treaty was never ratified by the British Government, and Mr Jackson was sent to the United States 
instead.107 In late May William & Richard Rathbone wrote that such rapid fluctuations in policy meant that 
it was difficult to give accurate quotations for prices.108 The resumption of the Non-Intercourse Act (brought 
in as retaliation for the non ratification of the Erskine Treaty) caused a ‘general sensation in American 
Produce’, especially in Uplands, and prices rose again in September.109 Sea Islands reached 34d per lb. 
Morrall & Borland noted that the recollection of the advance under the Embargo laws was pushing up prices 
more than the present situation warranted. Collective memory was clearly at work here.110  
 
Rumours and expectations continued to help construct the price throughout 1810 as prices fell again, if not 
so dramatically as in 1809.111 William & Richard Rathbone were able to report that whilst the continuance 
of the Non-Intercourse Law was important, its effects had been overrated because of embargo breakers, the 
use of neutral depots and circuitous routes such as via Amelia Island.112 Rumours also abounded in the 
London newspapers that a new envoy might be sent to the United States to replace Mr Jackson, although this 
time a peaceful resolution was not deemed so likely.113 The autumn of 1810 was initially taken up with 
reports of the revocation of the Berlin and Milan Decrees and that France was then open to American 
commerce. This move by France was in expectation that Britain would revoke its Orders in Council, but 
William & Richard Rathbone clearly doubted this would happen.114 They wrote ‘if the Orders in Council 
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should continue to operate, and the blockading system remain in force, our relations, with your country 
[United States], may become the subject of renewed anxiety’.115 In contrast, Buchanan & Benn, the next 
day, attributed the decline in prices more forcefully to the recent failures of banking and mercantile houses 
in London as well as in Liverpool and other manufacturing towns.116 Buchanan & Benn were still 
ruminating on the extensive failures in October; they thought it would take some time for confidence to be 
completely restored.117  
 
In early 1811 Hughes & Duncan complained of the ‘accumulating burthens of a protracted war’.118 Despite 
this, there was still an oversupply of cotton. In contrast to the short-term rises and falls earlier in the political 
tension, the situation had gone on for so long, Hughes & Duncan now thought that peace, and/or a 
renunciation of the Orders in Council and the Embargo, would actually increase prices.  William & Richard 
Rathbone pointed out the importance of political events in constructing the price. In November 1811 they 
noted that from past experience they did not expect the price to rise unless ‘from the influence of some 
political event’.119 Indeed, a small recovery, which was mainly in cottons rather than all American produce, 
was sparked by a report of the United States Committee of Foreign Relations, which was pro-war.120 In 
February 1812 Hughes & Duncan noted that ‘The calamity of an American war seems now almost 
inevitable’.121 However, in March William & Richard Rathbone noted that politics had ‘lost their influence 
upon public opinion’.122 Indeed, in early May, Hughes & Duncan reported on the declaration by the British 
government (dated 21st April) that if the Berlin and Milan decrees were repealed, the Orders in Council of 
1807 and 1809 would be revoked. This information was met with indifference, no doubt because it was 
believed that neither event would occur and there was little change in the markets. However, in May, news 
was received that the Embargo had been re-imposed by the United States, which caused ‘much disposition 
to purchase American produce’.123 Despite a small check in the prices caused by the news of Mr Perceval’s 
assassination, Hughes & Duncan were hoping that there would be a change in the British Government, and 
that ‘those obnoxious acts’, the Orders in Council, would be revoked’.124 In fact, they were with effect from 
the 1st August, and the Liverpool mercantile community was hopeful that this would lead to the repeal of the 
Non-Importation Act in return.125 Indeed, eighty to ninety vessels delayed their departure on this account, 
until news arrived on the Lady Madison that the bill proposing this had been withdrawn.126 Even the 
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manufacturers were hopeful. In early July Hughes & Duncan reported that the manufacturers were so busy 
‘sending off goods already manufactured for the American market’ that they were not purchasing cotton.127 
Prices continued to fall in July as those on the British side of the Atlantic were blissfully unaware that war 
had been declared on Britain by the United States on 19th June 1812. Of course, when the news of the 
Declaration of War reached Liverpool on the 18th July, prices quickly rose.128 Rumours of Flags of Truce 
from the United States circulated and reduced prices for a few days in late August, but once they were 
known to be without foundation, prices rose once again.129 In early October, Hughes & Duncan were still in 
a state of anxiety, and the market for American produce was generally stationary.130 
 
In January 1813 Hughes & Duncan could not ‘divest ourselves of the hope, that the war will be of short 
duration’.131 In February 1813 they were still in reflective mood; they wrote that the combined effect of the 
President’s message and the almost ‘total annihilation’ of the French Army in Russia, gave them hope the 
continental blockade might be ended.132 The British government was also considering opening up the East 
India trade and they thought this would mitigate some of the worse effects of the war.133 However, by March 
the British government was still refusing to grant licences to import American cotton in neutral vessels and 
Fine Sea Islands reached 48d per lb.134 Things might have been worse wrote Hughes & Duncan in February 
1814, were it not for the fact that several neutral vessels had eluded the American Blockade and some 
Bourbons had seen sold at the East India Company sales; yet stocks of cotton were still ‘unusually small’ 
and ‘diminishing rapidly’.135 They also thought the high cotton prices would continue even on peace, 
because the pent-up demand was so high.136 Indeed, they remained high even when news arrived that the 
Embargo and Non-Importation laws might be repealed, along with the repeal of the British restrictive 
measures regarding sending cotton via Amelia Island.137 It is clear that rumours, hopes, fear, expectations 
and the previous experience of the mercantile community all helped construct the price of raw cotton in 
Liverpool during this period. 
 
Forward Contracts 
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One last essential feature of a modern futures market is that the speculator can invest in a futures contract 
and own that contract, without ever owning the commodity or even having it in his possession. This did not 
appear to happen in the Liverpool cotton market in the period under discussion here. Both dealers and 
speculators normally had to purchase the cotton and either take on the storage costs involved or arrange for 
them to be paid via their purchase agreement. However, as noted above, forward contracts are part of a 
futures market and are very similar to futures contracts, although not regulated or standardised. Dumbell 
dates the existence of a market in ‘on arrival’ cotton by 1851 (in New York).138 However, such contracts 
were clearly in existence Liverpool forty years earlier. Whilst it was not possible to locate any forward 
contracts per se, there is evidence of episodic bursts of this ‘highly-advanced form of trading’ during our 
period.139 
 
On 26th August 1809, Old Boweds were offered at 15.5d to 16d per lb, or 2600 bags new ‘on board’ at 
16.75d or 17d per lb.140 In early September, Old Boweds were again offered at varying prices; 16.5d for 
Fair, 16.75 for Middling and 16d for Good – whereas Good Old Boweds were offered for 16d ‘on board’. 
Sea Islands were also priced as ‘on board’ at 25d for Middling and 27d for Clean. Middling Sea Islands 
bought at public sale were quoted at 25.75d and 25d at the same time.141 On 20th January 1810, Uplands 
could be purchased at 20.25d per lb Middling, 22d for Prime, and 20d Fair ‘on board’, the statements in the 
papers having ‘produced an instantaneous and important impression’ on the market.142 In March 1810, 
Uplands (again) had been sold at 17.25d to 18.5 per lb, 16.5d to 17d ‘on board’ and ‘to arrive’ at 16.5d.143  
 
In 1812, George Holt was trading various lots of United States cotton in advance. In the same year, the 
brokers M. & J. Pool were also making sales many months before the cotton arrived in port.144 
Unfortunately, these practices were not reflected in the Prices Currents of 1812. However, another burst of 
these more nuanced quotations can be found in 1814. In January of that year Maranhams (from Brazil) were 
quoted between 34.5d to 38d per lb or 1200 bags ‘to arrive’ between 32.5d and 33d per lb; Bahias (also from 
Brazil) were listed at 35d to 37.5d or 105 bags ‘to arrive’ at 33d; at the same time Pernambucos were listed 
at 36d to 39.5d or ‘to arrive’ at 35d.145 In early February, Bahias were listed at between 24d to 39d per lb, or 
‘to arrive’ at 36.5d to 37d per lb (quality not given). At the same time Maranhans were quoted at between 
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32d and 37d per lb, or 37d ‘to arrive’ (quality not given), the rapidity of price fluctuations being ‘almost 
without precedence’.146 Later in February, Pernambucos (again from Brazil) were listed at 37.5d to 36d, 
whilst 700 bags ‘on board’ were priced at 36d to 36.5d.147 In August, Boweds were listed at 25.5d ‘to arrive’ 
or 27d ‘good on shore’, perhaps because ‘every person was anxiously waiting for information’ on the 
negotiations with the United States.148  
 
However, ‘to arrive’ and ‘on board’ contracts were not only a feature of periods of tension and war. In 
January 1815 Maranhams were listed at between 29d and 29.5d, but 100 bags ‘to arrive’ were listed at 
28d.149 In February, 300 bags of Maranhams ‘on board’ were listed at between 23d and 25d, whilst the spot 
price was 25d to 25.5d.150 There were also some instances of forward contracts towards the end of our wider 
period. In October 1817, ‘fair and good fair’ Maranhams were quoted at 25.5d, whilst 300 bags of the same 
‘to arrive’ were 25d. A few months later, Pernambucos were listed at between 25d and 26d, or between 
24.5d and 25d ‘to arrive’.151 The last instance of forward trading found in the period under study was in July 
1819, when good Maranhams were listed at 16d, or ‘on board’ at 15.5d.152  
 
Given that the quality of the goods ‘on board’ and ‘to arrive’ were not always given, it is difficult to make 
exact comparisons in terms of relative price. However, with regards to the ‘on board’ price it is possible that 
these differing costs reflect some sort of storage costs that was paid by the seller given that they generally 
seem to be a little higher. Storage costs usually make up some of the basis (the price between the spot price 
and the futures price). We do not know the time delay on the ‘to arrive’ listings (except for the M. & J. Pool 
example), but it seems that it is likely that some price differential was being given for those prepared to wait 
for their goods. The price was potentially lower in March 1810, depending on the quality, and in the later 
examples, was assuredly slightly less for ‘to arrive’ delivery. Conversely, in 1814 the ‘to arrive’ prices seem 
relatively high. Perhaps this was for a superior grade of cotton. Occasonially, the number of bags ‘to arrive’ 
were listed. This could mean that particular ‘lots’ were being sold, although as Williams says, the contract 
does not necessarily have to be linked to a particular ‘lot’ of goods, what is important is when the title to 
goods passes.153  
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This issue of a ‘lot’ of bags might determine the quality to be expected. Given that, as noted above, the 
Prices Currents were based to a large extent on letters from the planters and factors in the United States, it is 
likely that the dealers in Liverpool were aware of the grades [quality] of cotton due to arrive on certain 
shipments. The dealers in Liverpool relied on their reputation to keep in business and so were unlikely to 
misrepresent the cotton for sale ‘to arrive’ or ‘on board’.154 If the cotton was not of the quality described, the 
dealer in Liverpool would have had to alter the price accordingly, and stern words would have been written 
to the correspondent on the other side of the Atlantic. Other ways of mitigating the issue of unseen quality is 
provided by M. & J. Pool. They linked the quality of their fifty bales of cotton to be delivered ‘to be equal to 
sample in [sic] Campbell’s hands’.155 The same price alteration would have had to take place if on arrival, 
the cotton did not meet that quality. Furthermore, regular correspondence from ports in the United States 
would inform the Liverpool dealers of exactly when ships left port. Captains would also report having met 
with other vessels on the sea. Storms and other mishaps notwithstanding, the Liverpool dealers would have 
had a good idea of when vessels were due to arrive from which ports. 
 
It is noteworthy that the ‘to arrive’ contracts in 1814 correspond with a price hike, exactly when hedgers 
would have wanted to protect themselves. Similarly, whilst in the 1809/10 instances, prices were not that 
high, the market was edgy due to the resumption of the Non-Intercourse Act, and increased speculation was 
noted, which would have pushed up prices further.156 Prices were also all raised during the later examples 
during 1815-1819, so buyers were clearly using ‘to arrive’ contracts to hedge. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Concentrating on the participants and features of a modern futures market rather than a narrow definition has 
facilitated a more nuanced understanding of the raw cotton market in Liverpool in the early nineteenth 
century. Although not many of the dealers listed themselves specifically as cotton dealers or cotton brokers, 
it is clear that this was a developing and identifiable sub-category at this time. Manufacturers were also still 
purchasing directly from Liverpool dealers, despite the development of specialised brokers such as Nicholas 
Waterhouse. These dealers (hedgers) clearly identified themselves as a category apart from the speculators, 
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who were denigrated by them as high-risk takers who adversely altered the market. Those speculators, 
although unquantifiable, were clearly an important part of the Liverpool cotton market, both numerically, 
and in terms of ‘discovering’ or constructing, the price. Contemporary dealers may not have appreciated 
them, but they were important participants in an embryonic futures market in which dealers could hedge. 
 
In terms of features, reliable and known grades were already in existence. Even if manufacturers would 
swap between grades on occasion, it is clear that they had preferred grades or ‘brands’ whose quality they 
knew and understood, such as Fine St Simons. There was also wide variability in price, not only over the 
whole period, but weekly and even daily. Ordinary Uplands varied between a low of 9.75d per lb in August 
1811 and a high of 28.75d per lb in Nov 1814; New Orleans between 13.5d per lb in September 1811 and 
38.5d per lb in March 1814; and Fine St Simons between 21.5d per lb in July 1811 and 72d per lb in 
December 1814. This variability worked in a symbiotic relationship with uncertainty. Price changes were 
caused by various uncertainties, which in turn caused the dealers anxiety which they tried to manage through 
hedging. Importantly, prices were clearly ‘discovered’ in Liverpool through shocks being mediated by its 
mercantile community. Shocks included political news such as Orders in Council, Non-Importation Acts, 
Embargoes and reports of battles and negotiations, but also Embargo breakers, blockades, rumours, financial 
failures and general economic depression. These shocks were all mediated over and above real supply and 
demand. Network memory, hopes, fears and expectations (whether realistic or not) all played an important 
role in discovering the price. There was also a time element in that there was a sense of ‘playing’ the market. 
Dealers might wait for speculators to reduce their price and the speculators might wait until increased 
demand had raised the price. Whilst there we have no physical evidence of futures contracts per se, there is 
evidence of forward trading and contracts, which are part of a modern futures market. Although clearly in 
episodic bursts, these more sophisticated price listings demonstrate that the Liverpool raw cotton market was 
already becoming far more nuanced. Importantly, it shows that the dealers were prepared to pay a different, 
if known price, for a secure delivery of cotton in the future. The fact that these bursts corresponded with a 
price hike suggests that indeed, hedging was already desirable and necessary in these periods. 
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This article does not argue that there was a modern futures market in Liverpool during the Anglo-American 
War. However, all the participants were already in existence, as were many of the features or functions, and 
earlier than previously identified. If we return to our definition of an embryonic futures market as 
 
One which exhibits many (if not all) of the participants and features of a modern futures market, but which 
is in a rudimentary stage with potential for development 
 
it is clear that an embryonic futures market in raw cotton existed in early nineteenth-century Liverpool. 
What was ‘in a price’ was already increasingly sophisticated. Surprisingly, cotton is often left out of the 
histories of futures markets, but this article suggests that it is worth investigating, not only cotton, but other 
commodities for evidence of similar embryonic futures markets in the early-nineteenth century.   
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WHAT'S IN A PRICE? 
        
 
         APPENDIX 
A 
 
         Prices by Month by Cotton Type, Pence per lb. * 
     
        
Sea 
Island  
 
Upland Upland  Upland Upland   
Sea 
Island  
Sea 
Island   
Sea 
Island  Fine &  New 
Cotton 
Type Ordinary Fair Good Fine Ordinary Middling Good 
St 
Simons Orleans 
Jan 1800 
         Feb 1800 
         Mar 1800 
         Apl 1800 
   
22 
   
34 23 
May 1800 
         Jun 1800 
         Jul 1800 
   
24 
   
36 27.5 
Aug 1800 
         Sep 1800 
         Oct 1800 
         Nov 1800 
         Dec 1800 
         Jan 1801 
  
  20 
   
35 26 
Feb 1801 
  
  21 
   
35 26 
Mar 1801 
         Apl 1801 
  
  21 
   
35 26 
May 1801 
  
  22 
   
35 26 
Jun 1801 
  
  22 
   
35 26 
Jul 1801 
         Aug 1801 
  
  20 
   
34 23 
Sep 1801 
  
  20 
   
34.5 22 
Oct 1801 
  
  21 
   
36 24 
Nov 1801 
   
19 
   
34 22 
Dec 1801 
         Jan 1802 
   
19 
   
34.5 20 
Feb 1802 
         Mar 1802 
 
15 
 
19 24 30 
 
33 19 
Apl 1802 
         May 1802 
   
12 24 29 
 
32 17 
Jun 1802 
   
13.5 24 28 
 
31 16 
Jul 1802 
   
14.5 24 28 
 
32 16.5 
Aug 1802 
   
14.5 24 28 
 
33 16 
Sep 1802 
   
15.5 24 28 
 
34 16 
Oct 1802 
         Nov 1802 
   
15 22 28 
 
35 16 
Dec 1802 
   
15 24 30 
 
35 16 
Jan 1803 
   
14.25 24 32 
 
36 15.5 
Feb 1803 
   
13.5 24 32 
 
38 15.5 
Mar 1803 
   
13.5 24 32 
 
38 16 
Apl 1803 
   
13 24 32 
 
38 16 
27 
 
May 1803 
   
13.25 28 33 
 
37 15 
Jun 1803 
   
15 28 33 
 
37 16 
Jul 1803 
   
13.5 28 33 
 
37 16 
Aug 1803 
   
13.5 24 30 
 
33 15 
Sep 1803 
   
14.5 24 30 
 
35 16.5 
Oct 1803 
   
14.5 24 29 
 
34 18 
Nov 1803 
         Dec 1803 
   
15 24 27 
 
30 20 
Jan 1804 
         Feb 1804 
   
15.5 24 27 
 
30 19 
Mar 1804 
   
15.25 24 27 
 
30 19 
Apl 1804 
   
14.5 24 27 
 
29 18 
May 1804 
         Jun 1804 
   
15 24 26 
 
28.5 17 
Jul 1804 
   
15.5 20 26 
 
29 16.5 
Aug 1804 
   
16.5 25 27 
 
29 18 
Sep 1804 
   
16.5 25 27 
 
29 18 
Oct 1804 
         Nov 1804 
   
17.5 26 29 
 
37 19 
Dec 1804 
   
20.5 30 34 
 
42 22 
Jan 1805 
   
20.5 30 36 
 
42 22 
Feb 1805 
    
33 39 
 
48 24 
Mar 1805 
   
24 33 39 
 
54 26 
Apl 1805 
   
21 32 40 
 
51 24 
May 1805 
         Jun 1805 
         Jul 1805 
         Aug 1805 
         Sep 1805 
         Oct 1805 
         Nov 1805 
         Dec 1805 
         Jan 1806 
         Feb 1806 
         Mar 1806 
         Apl 1806 
         May 1806 
         Jun 1806 
         Jul 1806 
         Aug 1806 
         Sep 1806 
         Oct 1806 
         Nov 1806 
         Dec 1806 
         Jan 1807 15.75 16.5 16.75 17 21 23.5 25 30 18 
Feb 1807 15.5 16 18 16.75 24 25 26 30 18.5 
Mar 1807 18.5 19 19 18.5 24 26 27 31 20.5 
Apl 1807 17.5 18 18.5 19 24 26 27 31 20.5 
May 1807 16 17.5 18 
  
25.5 28 31.5 20.5 
Jun 1807 16 17 18 19 22 25 26.5 30 19.5 
Jul 1807 15 17.5 18 19.5 21 24 27 31 20.5 
28 
 
Aug 1807 14 15.5 17 18 20 24 26 30 18.5 
Sep 1807 12.5 15.5 17 
 
18.5 23.5 25.75 28 18 
Oct 1807 12.5 15 15 17 20 24 26 30 18 
Nov 1807 12 15 15.5 16.5 19 23.5 25 30 18 
Dec 1807 12 15 16 16 20 26 25.5 28 18 
Jan 1808 13 15.75 16 16 17.5 24.5 26 29 19 
Feb 1808 17.5 15.5 16.5 19.5 17 23 30 30 20 
Mar 1808 17 16 17 18.25 24 26 28 30 20 
Apl 1808 15 17.5 18 19.5 22 26.5 28 
 
24 
May 1808 17.75 19.5 20.5 22 24 26.5 30 34 23 
Jun 1808 18.5 19.25 21.5 
 
19.5 26 29 34 23 
Jul 1808 19.5 21 23 23 25 28.5 31 38 25 
Aug 1808 21 22.5 24 24.5 27 33 36 48 27 
Sep 1808 24 24.5 33 28 28 30 36 48 27 
Oct 1808 29 31.5 33 33 36 40 48 54 36 
Nov 1808 29 30.5 31 33 42 45 50.5 57 35 
Dec 1808 29 30.5 33 35 40 47 54 58 36.5 
Jan 1809 30.5 31 33 34 33 54 54 69 36 
Feb 1809 31.5 
 
32 34 39 51 54 64 36 
Mar 1809 27 24.5 25 24.5 27 36 54 48 25 
Apl 1809 18.5 
  
18 23 26 30 30 18 
May 1809 14 14 16 16 20 27 29 30 17 
Jun 1809 12.5 14 14.5 14.5 21 23 24 27 19 
Jul 1809 14.75 
 
15.5 15.5 21 24 25 27 17.5 
Aug 1809 15.75 16.25 
 
16.5 22 25 26 28.5 18.5 
Sep 1809 16 16 23 23 21 24 29 34 24 
Oct 1809 20 21 
 
20.5 26 28 27.5 32 22.5 
Nov 1809 19.5 19.5 20.5 21 26 27 27.5 31 23 
Dec 1809 21 19.75 
  
23 28 29.5 31 23 
Jan 1810 20 20 
 
22 24.5 26.5 28 32 22.5 
Feb 1810 18 18 18.75 19 24 26 26.5 28 20 
Mar 1810 17 
 
18 16.5 23 25 26 29 19.5 
Apl 1810 15 15.75 16 16.5 24 25.25 26 29 18.5 
May 1810 16 16.5 17 17 24 25 26.5 29 19.5 
Jun 1810 
 
14.5 15 16 24 22 25 30 17.5 
Jul 1810 15 15.75 16.5 17 23 24 25 28 18.5 
Aug 1810 14 14.5 15.5 18.5 22 23.5 24 27 18 
Sep 1810 13.5 14.5 16.5 16 22.5 24 26.5 28 18 
Oct 1810 15 14 16.5 15.5 23 23.5 25 26.5 17.5 
Nov 1810 13.5 12.5 13 14.5 19 22 23.5 25 16.5 
Dec 1810 12.5 14 15.5 14.75 19.5 21 24.5 27 17.25 
Jan 1811 12.5 13 14.5 15 22.5 22.5 23.75 24 17 
Feb 1811 12 13.5 14.5 
 
19.5 22 23 24 16.5 
Mar 1811 10.5 12.5 14 13.5 15.5 21.5 23.5 26 15.5 
Apl 1811 11.25 12.5 14 14 20.5 21 23 24.5 16 
May 1811 11 13.5 13.75 13.75 19.75 21 23 24 15.75 
Jun 1811 11.5 12.25 13.25 12.75 16.75 21 22.5 25.5 16 
Jul 1811 10 11 12.5 12.75 15.5 18.5 21 21.5 13.75 
Aug 1811 9.75 12.25 12.75 
 
15.25 19 20.5 21.5 14 
Sep 1811 11 12.5 13.5 
 
15.25 18.5 20.25 22 13.5 
Oct 1811 10.5 11 12 12.75 13 19.5 21.5 22 13.75 
29 
 
Nov 1811 12.5 13.5 14.75 14 18 21.5 24.5 24 15.5 
Dec 1811 
 
14.5 16 
 
22.5 22.5 26.75 30 17.5 
Jan 1812 14 14.5 15.5 16 21.3 23.5 25 30 17 
Feb 1812 13 15 15.5 16 22 24 27 28 18 
Mar 1812 13.5 14.5 14.75 15.5 19 23 26 28 17.25 
Apl 1812 13 14.5 15 15 21.25 21.5 23 26 16.5 
May 1812 13 15 15.5 15.5 22 22 24 27 17 
Jun 1812 13 13.75 14 15 22 22.5 23.5 26 16.5 
Jul 1812 12.25 13.5 14 14.5 18 21.5 24 25 15.75 
Aug 1812 14 15.25 16 16 14.75 24.5 26 28 17 
Sep 1812 14 15.25 16 16.25 
 
25.5 27 29 17 
Oct 1812 
 
15.5 18.25 16.5 
 
27 30 28 17.5 
Nov 1812 17 17.75 18.5 18.5 19.5 
 
31 32 20 
Dec 1812 17 21.5 23 23.5 
 
27 32 40 25.5 
Jan 1813 21.5 21.5 22.5 24 32 34 38 40 25.5 
Feb 1813 22.75 23.25 24 35 28 36 41 48 28 
Mar 1813 
 
22.5 24 24.5 27 34 39 46 27 
Apl 1813 21.5 23 24 23.75 31 34 39 42 26 
May 1813 22.5 23.5 24 25 31 34 40 48 28 
Jun 1813 20.5 20 24 23 26 33 36 38 24 
Jul 1813 
 
21.5 22.5 22.25 26 35 36 38 24 
Aug 1813 20.75 22 23 23 31 32 36 39 25 
Sep 1813 21 23 24 24 32 33 36 40 23.5 
Oct 1813 
 
22.25 24.25 24.5 31 34 36.5 40 27.5 
Nov 1813 22.5 23.5 25.25 25 30 32 36 40 27.5 
Dec 1813 24 27 29 29 36 34 43 45 31 
Jan 1814 
 
34.5 
 
36 38 43 47 51 37.5 
Feb 1814 
  
34 34 39 42 46 51 38 
Mar 1814 
 
32.5 34 34 39 42 46 52 38.5 
Apl 1814 
 
32.5 32 33.5 42 42 47 51 38 
May 1814 
  
30 30 41 43 46 48 32 
Jun 1814 
  
26 25.5 36 41 43 46 29 
Jul 1814 23.5 23.5 26 28 35 37 42 44 32 
Aug 1814 25 
 
28 28 35 40 42 45 32 
Sep 1814 
  
33 33 36 42 48 51 36 
Oct 1814 
  
31.25 33 38 42 48 51 36 
Nov 1814 28.75 
 
31.5 30.75 48 51 57 63 34 
Dec 1814 
   
30.5 42 49 57 72 33 
Jan 1815 22 
  
24 
 
38 48 48 28 
Feb 1815 
   
18.5 
   
42 26 
Mar 1815 20 21 21 21.5 30 36 39 43 25 
Apl 1815 
         May 1815 
   
21.75 22 26 30 35 24 
Jun 1815 
   
20 24 25 28 32 23 
Jul 1815 
         Aug 1815 
         Sep 1815 21.5 
  
24 
 
33 
 
43 27.5 
Oct 1815 
         Nov 1815 
   
22 30 31 34 38 25 
Dec 1815 
   
23 
   
31 24 
Jan 1816 17 16 17 18 23 26 29 34 21 
30 
 
Feb 1816 
         Mar 1816 19 17 18.5 19.5 23 26 30.5 35 22 
Apl 1816 20 
  
21 30 
  
39 24 
May 1816 19 
  
20 27 
  
36 23 
Jun 1816 19 19.25 20.5 21 26 28 30 33 23 
Jul 1816 
         Aug 1816 18.5 
  
20.5 24 
  
33 22.5 
Sep 1816 18 
 
19 21 
   
33 23 
Oct 1816 
  
19.25 20.5 23 
  
29 23 
Nov 1816 17 18 
 
20 22 21 
 
27 22 
Dec 1816 17.5 18.75 19.25 20.5 23 
  
28 22 
Jan 1817 
   
20.5 25 
 
25.5 28.5 22.5 
Feb 1817 
   
21.75 
   
30 23.75 
Mar 1817 
 
20.25 20.5 21.5 24 26 29 31.5 23 
Apl 1817 
  
20 21 25 
  
33 23 
May 1817 19 19 20.75 21.25 25 26 27 31 23 
Jun 1817 16.5 18 18.5 20 
   
30 21.5 
Jul 1817 
  
18.75 20 
   
31 22 
Aug 1817 18.75 19.25 21 22 24 27.5 28.5 34 23.5 
Sep 1817 19.5 20.75 22 22.5 24 26.5 30 34 25 
Oct 1817 
   
23 26.5 
  
36 25.5 
Nov 1817 
   
22 
   
34 24 
Dec 1817 
         Jan 1818 18.5 
  
22 
   
36 24 
Feb 1818 
         Mar 1818 
  
21.5 
  
31 35 42 23.5 
Apl 1818 
   
22 
   
40 22.5 
May 1818 20 
 
20.5 21.25 
   
36 24.5 
Jun 1818 
         Jul 1818 20 20.25 20.5 21.25 
 
45 
 
48 24 
Aug 1818 19.75 20.25 20.75 21.75 
    
24 
Sep 1818 20.75 20.25 
 
22 
 
37 
 
48 24 
Oct 1818 
 
20   21.5 28 
  
50 23.5 
Nov 1818 
   
20.5 
   
42 22 
Dec 1818 17 18 19 19.5 26 32 39 48 20.5 
Jan 1819 18 17.5 18 19 26 34 36 40 23 
Feb 1819 
         Mar 1819 14.5 
  
15 
   
30 16 
Apl 1819 
   
13.25 
   
29 14.5 
May 1819 
   
13 
   
26 13.5 
Jun 1819 
         Jul 1819 11.25 12 13 14 24 26 26 32 14 
Aug 1819 
         Sep 1819 13 14 14.5 15 
 
24 34 42 17 
Oct 1819 12.25 12.5 13 13.5 
 
24 28 
 
15 
Nov 1819 
         Dec 1819 
  
13.5 
   
26 
 
14.75 
          * Bold denotes prices taken from Liverpool Cotton Association, Liverpool Record Office 
  Source: Author's Database 
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1 Riello, Cotton. Like Riello, this article is more concerned with the process of price construction than the 
measurable outcome, p. 4. See also Beckert, Empire of Cotton: A New History of Cotton, who gives 
Liverpool surprisingly little coverage.    
2 Esteban, “British Textile Prices”; Harley and Crafts, “Cotton Textiles and Industrial Output Growth”; 
Harley, “Cotton Textile Prices”; Esteban, “Factory Costs, Market Prices, and Indian Calicoes”; Harley, 
“Cotton Textile Prices Revisited”; Broadberry and Gupta, “Lancashire, India, and Shifting Competitive 
Advantage”. 
3 Temin, “The Causes of Cotton-Price Fluctuations” p.463. 
4 Dumbell, “Early Liverpool Cotton Imports”; Dumbell, “The Beginnings of the Liverpool Cotton Trade”; 
Hyde, Parkinson and Marriner, “The Cotton Broker and the Rise of the Liverpool Cotton Market”. This is 
also true of the leading books on the cotton trade. Ellison, The Cotton Trade of Great Britain, and 
Wadsworth and de L. Mann, The Cotton Trade and Industrial Lancashire. 
5 McCusker, “The Demise of Distance”, p.308. Printed Prices Currents were just one form of a variety of 
business press. See also McCusker, “European Bills of Entry”. 
6 See that of Grenada for 1785 at CO 101/26/60, f.409, TNA. Interestingly, George Marsden, seemingly 
McConnel & Kennedy of Manchester’s main provider of raw cotton, persisted in using hand written Prices 
Current as late as 1812, even when giving almost weekly updates. McConnel & Kennedy correspondence, 
GB133, MCK 2/1/17 and MCK 2/1/18, John Rylands Library, Manchester, UK. 
7 Prix Courant General, Dec 1812, E219/629, TNA; Price Current, Antwerp, Sep 1814, GB133, MCK 
2/1/20/7, John Rylands Library. 
8 See Prices Current for Nassau Apl 1786 at CO 23/25/42; for Kingston, Jun and Jul 1805 at CO 137/114/51 
ff.159, 174; for Barbados Oct 1805 at CO 28/73/1, f.96; for Grenada Sep 1786 at CO/101/26, f.409 all TNA. 
9 On Samuel G. Arnold’s father see Coyle, Welcome Arnold. For Brown & Ives see Hedges, The Browns of 
Providence Plantation. Please note that at the time of transcription [May 2014] the Prices Current portion of 
this collection was still being processed, and may be catalogued differently in future. 
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10 Prices were also taken from the Liverpool Cotton Association collection (380 COT, Liverpool Record 
Office), where not available in the JCB collection 1807-1814. Note that these were all produced by one 
person, Samuel Hope, and quote cotton prices only, so do they not give the range and breadth of opinion of 
those at the JCB. 
11 Schoen, Fragile Fabric, p.41. For exports by state see Bruchey, Growth of the American Economy. Others 
such as Tennessees were also listed in the Prices Current. G. Barbadense is a New World cotton indigenous 
to South America. Short staple cottons come from both the Old World (G. Arboreum and G. Herbaceum) 
and the New World (G. Hirsutum). Lakwete, Inventing the Cotton Gin, p.2. 
12 Hull, Fundamentals of Futures and Options Markets, p.4. 
13 Carter, Options and Futures Markets, pp.83, 85. 
14 Williams, “The Origins of Futures Markets”, passim. He also omitted an active forward contracts market 
in wool between England and Southern Europe in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. Bell et 
al, The English Wool Market. Advance contracts were commonly used in the wool trade, see Bell et al, 
Advance Contracts for Wool. 
15 Williams, “Liverpool Merchants and the Cotton Trade”, p.19. 
16 Bernstein argues that these rules constitute a Private Legal System. Bernstein, “Private Commercial Law 
in the Cotton Industry”; Williams, “The Origins of Futures Markets”, p.306. See the Liverpool Cotton 
Association rules of 1871 at 380 COT 1/1/1 at LRO. 
17 Beckert, Empire of Cotton, p.212. See also Hall, ‘The Liverpool Cotton Market, passim. 
18 Hull, Fundamentals of Futures and Options Markets, p. 1; Telser, “Why There Are Organised Futures 
Markets”, pp.1, 11; Carter, Futures and Options Markets, p. 3; Howell, “Quality-Price Differentials”, p.30. 
19 Williams, “Origins of Futures Markets”, p.307. 
20 Carter, Futures and Options Markets, pp.4-6; Hull, Fundamentals of Futures and Options Markets, p.575. 
21 Williams, “The Origins of Futures Markets”, p.308. 
22 Carter, Futures and Options Markets, p.4. 
23 Character is based on indefinable characteristics such as soil, climate, water supply and seed stocks. Cox, 
“Relation of the Price and Quality of Cotton”. 
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24 See http://www.cottoninc.com/fiber/quality/Classification-Of-Cotton/Maintaining-Official-Standards-
Classification/ accessed 8 Nov 2017. 
25 Cox, “Relation of the Price and Quality of Cotton”. See also Howell, “Quality Price Differentials in 
Cotton Marketing”. 
26 Vaillant et al, “Futures Markets of Agricultural Commodities”, Abstract. 
27 Carter, Futures and Options Markets, p.19. 
28 Carter, Futures and Options Markets, pp.83-85. Where the price for contracts with long delivery is lower 
for those on shorter delivery, the market is said to be inverted. This can happen where there is a relatively 
low carry over of stocks, where there is a shortage of stocks to be delivered, or where there is a shortage of 
speculators willing to hold long futures positions, pp.40, 91. 
29 Carter, Futures and Options Markets, p.3. 
30 Williams, “The Origins of Futures Markets”, p.310. 
31 It is possible to argue that the Exchange Flags, where the cotton brokers were known to deal counts as a 
formal site, but there were no written rules and regulations at this time, and formal contracts cannot be 
proved. 
32 Based on the definition of embryonic in Stephenson, Oxford English Dictionary. 
33 Schoen, Fragile Fabric, pp.45, 48-49. 
34 Dumbell, “Early Liverpool Cotton Imports”, p.362. 
35 Ellison, Cotton Trade, pp.83-84. 
36 A bale of cotton yarn was 3-4 Cwt (136.077 (300lbs) -181.436kg (400)), Zupco, A Dictionary, p.12. He 
does not list the weight for bags or bales of raw cotton, although Ellison lists them as 400lbs, Cotton Trade, 
p.85. The average bale size for raw cotton in the US today is 495 lbs. 
http://www.cottoninc.com/fiber/quality/US-Fiber-Chart/Bale-Size/index.cfm accessed 20 Jan 2017. 
37 Ellison, Cotton Trade, pp.85-86. 
38 Schoen, Fragile Fabric p.49. 
39 Catling, The Spinning Mule, chapter one. 
40 Lakwete, Inventing the Cotton Gin, p 32. 
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41 Catling, The Spinning Mule, chapter three. 
42 Lakwete, Inventing the Cotton Gin, p.33. 
43 Lakwete’s fascinating business history demonstrates that the rather scholarly Whitney was unlikely to 
have been the saw gin’s real inventor. She argues that he and his financial backer and later partner, Phineas 
Miller, probably got the patent through ‘duplicity masked by prestige’ having stolen the ideas from local 
artisans. Lakwete, Inventing the Cotton Gin, p.55. 
44 Howell, “Quality Price Differentials in Cotton Marketing”, p.330. Babardense, (of which Sea Island is an 
example) a long-staple cotton, continued to be cleaned using the ancient foot-powered roller gin. Lakwete, 
Inventing the Cotton Gin, p.150. 
45 See Schoen, Fragile Fabric, pp.39-51 on the early growth of the cotton trade between the United States 
and Great Britain. 
46 On the causes of the French Wars see Rothenburg, “The Origins, Causes, and Extension of the Wars”. 
47 Schoen, Fragile Fabric, p.69. See also Crouzet, “The Impact of the French Wars, p.190. 
48 Matters were brought to a head when the British frigate Leopard fired on, and then boarded, the USS 
Chesapeake on 22 June 1807 allegedly in order to retrieve deserters. Great Britain captured 917 American 
ships between 1803 and 1812. Silverstone, Divided Union, pp.71–75. 
49 Daniels, “American Cotton Trade”. See also Frankel, “The 1807-1809 Embargo Against Britain”. The 
Americans, and especially the south, suffered badly from the various Embargoes. Schoen, Fragile Fabric, 
chapter two. 
50 This facilitated trust and enabled trade to commence quickly once legal again. Haggerty, ‘Merely for 
Money’?, chapter “Trust”, pp.66-96.  
51 References are to the Brown Family Business Papers unless otherwise noted. 
52 Gore’s Directory, 1805; These included three women.  
 Haggerty, The British-Atlantic Trading Community, p.7. 
53 Prices Current, 2 Mar 1811, Hughes & Duncan. 
54 Nicholas Waterhouse Ledger, LUL MS 138, ff.569, 581, Sydney Jones Library. 
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55 Andrew, Aristocratic Vice, chapter five. For criticism of stock jobbing see Bowen, “The Pests of Human 
Society”. Investments in the markets as part of a broader portfolio was not criticised however. Hancock, 
“Domestic Bubbling”. 
56 Prices Current, 26 Aug 1809, Samuel Hope. 
57 Prices Current, Morrall & Borland, 19 Sep 1809. 
58 Prices Current, 12 Jan 1813, William & Richard Rathbone. 
59 Prices Current, 12 Feb 1808, Joseph Howell, Arnold Family Business Papers, Prices Currents (hereafter 
AFBPPC). 
60 Prices Current, 20 Oct 1808, Buchanan & Benn. 
61 Prices Current, 9 Mar 1810, Conway & Davidson. 
62 Haggerty, “Risk and Risk Management”. 
63 Dumbell, “Early Liverpool Cotton Imports”, p.365. 
64 Seven brokers were female. Haggerty, British-Atlantic Trading Community, p.82. The eight were George 
Marsden, William Peers, James Stock, James Yates, Theophilus Lewthwaite, Samuel Hope, James and John 
Greaves. Gore’s Directory, 1805.  
65 See GB133 MCK 2/1/17 & 18. 
66 Nicholas Waterhouse Ledger, LUL MS 138, Special Collections and Manuscripts, Sydney Jones Library. 
67 See for example, Prices Current, Rathbone, Hughes & Duncan, 13 Jul 1804; Prices Current, Morrall & 
Borland, 19 Jan 1807, both AFBPPC. 
68 See for example, Prices Current, Samuel Hope, 18 Feb 1815. 
69 Prices Current, Morrall & Borland, 14 Oct 1810. 
70 See http://www.cottoninc.com/fiber/quality/US-Fiber-Chart/US-Cotton-Standards/, accessed 8 Nov 2017. 
71 Prices Current, Buchanan & Benn, 14 Nov 1810. 
72 Howell, “Quality-Price Differentials,” pp.329-330. 
73 Prices Current, 20 Sep 1808, Joseph Howell, AFBPPC. Cotton from Brazil was the main replacement for 
cotton from the United States during this period. Davis, The Industrial Revolution, p.40. 
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74 The trend shown in remarkably similar to Marwade’s, although because his prices were based only on 
Prime Uplands he misses the spike in early 1805 in Fine Sea Islands (see graph at front). Chr. G. Marwarde, 
Commercial and Political Observations on the State of the Cotton Market;  Shewing  [sic] Its Various 
Fluctuations in Price, from the Treaty of Amiens, in the Year 1801, to the Present Time (Liverpool: Printed 
by J. Lang, 1811). These prices are also broadly in line with Mitchell and Deane, although the Prices 
Currents from Liverpool often only list Upland Prime/Fine which are usually slightly higher than those 
listed by Mitchell and Deane, Abstract of British Historical Statistics, p.496. 
75 Prices Current, 23 Feb 1814, Hughes & Duncan. See the reporting of cotton coming in via Amelia Island 
at Prices Current, Samuel Hope, 22 Oct 1814; 29 Oct 1814. 
76 Note that usually only one price was given for New Orleans. The full list of prices can be found at 
Appendix A. 
77 This appears to have been due to real demand from the manufacturers, although some Liverpool 
merchants commented that the market was rather dull due to high imports during 1818. Prices Current, 
Buchanan, Smith & Co., 1 Jan 1819; Prices Current, Thomas and John D. Thornely, 23 Jan 1819. 
78 The Berlin Decrees, Orders in Council and the American Embargo all disrupted exports and emphasised 
wartime distress, and in 1803 and 1808 particularly. Harley, “Cotton Textile Prices”, pp.63-64. 
79 Prices Current, 12 Feb 1808, Joseph Howell, AFBPPC.  
80 Prices Current, 20 Oct 1808, Buchanan & Benn.. 
81 Prices Current, William & Richard Rathbone, 27 Mar 1809. Contemporaries did not always distinguish 
between the Embargo, the Non-Importation and Non-Intercourse Acts. James Maury, the American Consul 
reported that 6,000 bales of cotton had been smuggled in during December 1808 and January 1809. Schoen, 
Fragile Fabric, p.80. 
82 Prices Current, 27 Mar 1809, William & Richard Rathbone. 
83 Prices Current, 1 Apl 1809, William & Richard Rathbone. 
84 Prices Current, 16 Jun 1810, William & Richard Rathbone. 
85 Prices Current, 16 Jun 1810, William & Richard Rathbone. On realised versus quoted prices see Çalişkan, 
Market Threads, pp.23-24. 
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86 Prices Current, 9 Nov 1810, William & Richard Rathbone. 
87 Prices Current, 5 Jan 1811, Hughes & Duncan. 
88 Daniels, “American Cotton Trade”, p.278. 
89 New Orleans reached their low in September 1811 at 13.5 per lb. 
90 Prices Current, 8 Nov 1811, William & Richard Rathbone. Their Prices Current of 24 Oct 1811 clearly 
lays out the regulations for importing the produce of the United States. 
91 Prices Current, 22 Feb 1812, Daniel Buchanan, AFBPPC. Much of this fluctuation is hidden in the 
database because the prices are recorded monthly. 
92 Prices Current, 25 Jul 1812, Hughes & Duncan. Hughes & Duncan noted a slight fall after the initial 
response, but the trend for the remainder of the year was up. 
93 Prices Current, 29 Aug 1812, Hughes & Duncan. 
94 Prices Current, Liverpool, 20 Oct 1812, Hughes & Duncan. 
95 Prices Current, 17 Jul 1813, Hughes & Duncan. 
96 Prices Current, 3 Dec 1814, Samuel Hope. 
97 Prices Current, 19 Nov 1814, Samuel Hope. 
98 Prices Current, 10 Oct 1807; 24 Oct 1807, Morrall & Borland 
99 Prices Current, 13 Oct 1807, Martin, Hope & Thornely. 
100 Prices Current, 14 Nov 1807, Morrall & Borland. 
101 In response to Napoleon’s Continental System these Orders in Council required American Vessels to stop 
in British Ports before travelling to French-held ports, to have a special license for cotton, and pay an export 
tax of 9d per lb. Schoen, Fragile Fabric, p.74. 
102 Prices Current, 13 Mar 1808, Joseph Howell, AFBPPC. 
103 Buchanan & Benn say Embargo, but in fact that had been removed and replaced with the Non-
Importation Act in March 1809. Daniels, “Cotton Trade”, p.278. 
104 Prices Current, 29 Apl 1809, Hughes & Duncan. In the early part of the month a rumour had briefly 
prevailed that Congress had not passed the repeal and that had briefly pushed up prices. 
38 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
105 Prices Current, 19 Apl 1809, William & Richard Rathbone. Concerns were raised about the Non-
Importation Act as it was believed it needed careful management, that many ports in Europe were not 
neutral and that it might cause more problems than it solved. See for example, Prices Current, 19 Apl 1809, 
Martin, Hope & Thornely. 
106 Prices Current, 1 May 1809, Hughes & Duncan; Prices Current, 2 May 1809, William & Richard 
Rathbone. A copy of the Orders in Council rescinding the previous Orders can be found here. 
107 Prices Current, 17 Jun 1809, Morrall & Borland. 
108 The British government argued that he had overstepped his authority. Prices Current, 29 May 1809, 
William & Richard Rathbone. 
109 Prices Current, 9 Sep 1809, Morrall & Borland.. 
110 On collective memory in networks see Hancock, “The Trouble with Networks”. 
111 Prices Current, 16 Jun 1810, William & Richard Rathbone. 
112 On neutral depots see Schoen, Fragile Fabric, p.85. Amelia Island is just off the coast of Florida and 
then in Spanish hands, and so was officially neutral. See War, “The Commerce of East Florida”. 
113 Slauter argues that speculation on politics in the press was as prevalent as speculation on stocks by the 
late eighteenth century. Slauter, “Forward-Looking Statements”. 
114 This did not occur until June 1812. 
115 Prices Current, 22 Aug 1810, William & Richard Rathbone. 
116 Prices Current, 23 Aug 1810, Buchanan & Benn. 
117 Prices Current, 13 Oct 1810, Buchanan & Benn. 
118 Referring to the Napoleonic Wars. Prices Current, 2 Mar 1811, Hughes & Duncan. 
119 Prices Current, 8 Nov 1811, William & Richard Rathbone. 
120 Schoen, Fragile Fabric, pp.88-89. 
121 Prices Current, 21 Feb 1812, Hughes & Duncan. 
122 Prices Current, 14 Mar 1812, William & Richard Rathbone. (There were no Prices Current for Apl 1812 
in the JCB). 
123 Prices Current, 30 May 1812, Hughes & Duncan. 
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124 Prices Current, 30 May 1812, Hughes & Duncan. Hughes & Duncan thought a coalition might occur, but 
that if Lord Wellesley and Mr Canning were those added to the government, its stance would not change. 
Spencer Perceval was Prime Minister when he was assassinated on 11 May 1812 by a merchant, John 
Bellingham. Jupp, “Spencer Perceval”. 
125 Prices Current, 25 Jun 1812, Hughes & Duncan. 
126 Prices Current, 30 May 1812, 25 Jun 1812. 
127 Prices Current, 4 Jul 1812, Hughes & Duncan. 
128 Prices Current, 25 Jul 1812, Hughes & Duncan. Hughes & Duncan noted a slight fall after the initial 
response, but the trend for the remainder of the year was up. 
129 Prices Current, 29 Aug 1812, Hughes & Duncan. 
130 Prices Current, 5 Oct 1812, Hughes & Duncan. 
131 Prices Current, 9 Jan 1813, Hughes & Duncan.  
132 Prices Current, 1 Feb 1813, Hughes & Duncan. 
133 The EIC lost its monopoly of the India Trade in 1813. Bowen, The Business of Empire, pp.42-43. 
134 Prices Current, 1 Mar 1813, Hughes & Duncan. 
135 Prices Current, 23 Feb 1814, Hughes & Duncan. 
136 Figure 1 demonstrates that cotton prices in fact did remain relatively high after 1814, if checked slightly. 
They did not expect other American produce to keep their high prices however. 
137 Presumably they hoped that the British government would start issuing licences for neutral vessels once 
again. Making Florida part of the United States became a war aim for the Americans. See Silverstone, 
Divided Union, pp.106-114. 
138 Dumbell, “The Origin of Cotton Futures”, p.259. These contracts were routine in Liverpool by 1871. See 
Liverpool Cotton Brokers Association Regulations, p.12. 
139 Williams, “The Origins of Futures Markets”, p.309. 
140 Prices Current, 26 Aug 1809, Samuel Hope. 
141 Prices Current, 2 Sep 1809, Samuel Hope. 
142 Prices Current, 20 Jan 1810, Samuel Hope 
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143 Prices Current, 3 Mar 1810, Samuel Hope. 
144 Hall, ‘The Liverpool Cotton Market, p.102. 
145 George Marsden to McConnell & Kennedy, 28 Jan 1814, MCK/21/20/6. 
146 Prices Current, 5 Feb 1814, Samuel Hope. 
147 George Marsden to McConnell & Kennedy, 26 Feb 1814, MCK/21/20/6. 
148 Prices Current, 20 Aug 1814, Samuel Hope. 
149 Prices Current, Ewart & Rutson, 14 Jan 1815, Liverpool Cotton Association, 380 COT 1/11/4. 
150 Prices Current, Ewart & Rutson, 25 Feb 1815, Liverpool Cotton Association, 380 COT 1/11/4. 
151 Prices Current, Samuel Hope, 14 Feb 1818. 
152 Prices Current, Samuel Hope, 3 Jul 1819. 
153 Williams, “Origins of Futures Markets”, pp.310-11. 
154 Haggerty, ‘Merely for Money’?, chapter “Reputation”, pp.97-131. 
155 Cited in Hall, The Liverpool Cotton Market’, p.102. 
156 Prices Current, 9 Sep 1809, Morrall & Borland. Dixon, Lavater & Co. noted increased speculation to a 
dangerous level. Prices Current, 14 Oct 1809, AFBPPC. 
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